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Johannes Giesinger
Evaluating School Choice Policies: 
A Response to Harry Brighouse
Abstract: In his writings on school choice and educational justice, Harry Brighouse presents norma-
tive evaluations of various choice systems. This paper responds to Brighouse’s claim that it is inade-
quate to criticise these evaluations with reference to empirical data concerning the effects of school  
choice.
In his book School Choice and Social Justice (2000), as well as in a recent paper (2008), Harry 
Brighouse evaluates different school choice policies in light of normative principles. In a re-
sponse to the objections Samara Foster (2002) raises against his book, he declares that critici-
sing his evaluations with reference to empirical data is ‘beside the point’ (Brighouse, 2002, 
p. 655). This response of his gives rise to the question of what Brighouse is actually doing 
when he describes some choice mechanisms as more just—or more equitable— than others. 
Behind this question lies another more fundamental problem; that is, what role does (moral) 
philosophy play in the field of education policy? 
Obviously, a philosophical approach to education policy will try to outline the normati-
ve ideas or principles that should guide the decisions of policy makers. This is what Brig-
house does when he argues for a principle of educational equality. But it is one thing to ju-
stify such a principle and another to answer the question ‘equality of what?’ Even if we ma-
nage to clarify this point, it cannot be said, of course, that everything we need for good deci-
sion making is in our hands. If we want to know whether a certain reform program should 
be implemented within a particular educational system, we need detailed knowledge about 
the status quo of this system. On this basis, we can try to figure out what will happen if the 
planned reform is realised. We might turn to empirical studies that evaluate similar reforms 
in other contexts, but it will never be possible to know in advance exactly what the effects of 
such a reform in our specific context will be.
As Brighouse (ibid.) explains, his aim is not to make ‘empirical predictions,’ and he con-
tinues by saying: ‘The purpose of my discussion of actually-existing choice programmes is 
to isolate which features of choice programmes are likely to serve, and which are likely to 
inhibit justice.’ This is what he is aiming to achieve in his recent article where he comments 
on different voucher schemes, discussing how equitable we can [590] expect each case to be. 
These comments are, if we believe Brighouse’s earlier statements,  independent of evidence 
gained through the empirical evaluation of existing choice schemes. This claim is evaluated 
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in the second part of this paper through the conceptual framework that is outlined in the 
first part. 
Normative Principles and Empirical Conditions
A normative assessment of school choice policies is always guided, at least implicitly, by a 
conception of (educational) justice. It is useful to distinguish the normative  objectives that 
are defined by such a conception from the empirical conditions necessary to reach them.
But let us stay on the normative level, at first. Rival conceptions of educational justice 
propose different distributions of the good in question—education. Each conception has to 
clarify how this good is to be distributed among individuals, and what exactly is to be dis-
tributed; is it resources, educational opportunities, quality or quantity of education or even 
educational outcomes? Brighouse does not hesitate to say that education should be distribu-
ted equally,  admitting that the idea of educational equality is hard to elucidate. In his cur-
rent paper, he says: ‘I am well aware of the variety of interpretations of equality in educati-
on, and I am going to simplify [...] by using the vague phrase ‘equally good provision for 
each individual child’ to mean equality in education’ (Brighouse,  2008, p. 41). This formula-
tion, it seems, is more focussed on the aspect of educational inputs (e.g., resources or educa-
tional quality) than on outcomes. But Brighouse considers it irrelevant, in the context of his 
argument on school choice, to know exactly what is to be distributed equally in the realm of 
education.
At least one thing, however, must be made clear—the idea of educational equality is, in 
Brighouse’s view, not to be situated on the level of (parental) choice. It does not matter, in 
the first place,  whether parents have equal  opportunities for choice,  but rather whether 
their children get an equally good education. Brighouse’s account does not emphasize the 
value of choice but the principle of equality; choice is only valuable insofar as it promotes 
educational equality (see Brighouse, 2008, p. 49).1 To provide equal choice opportunities is, 
in this sense, not an objective in itself but a possible means to realise some other objective. 
The same should be said, I think, with regard to a principle of equal educational resources. 
If we would take equality of resources as an objective in itself, then at least some voucher  
schemes – those providing equal resources to each child and prohibiting additional invest-
ments – would guarantee the realisation of educational justice. But an equal distribution of 
educational resources does not ensure that each child gets an equally good education. It is  
not merely that some children might need more resources than others; the main point is 
that resources have to be made effective by schools, teachers and their students. They have 
to be transformed into educational quality and achievement. If we take  [591] educational 
quality or achievement as an objective, a sufficient amount of resources is among the empi-
rical conditions needed to reach it.
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These last remarks make use of the distinction that was mentioned at the beginning —
between normative objectives and empirical conditions.  Empirical  researchers have long 
tried to identify the causes of unequal educational achievement. It seems clear that such ine-
qualities  are  in  part  caused by genetic  differences  and that  inequalities  of  family back-
ground circumstances play a crucial role as well. The quality of schooling, which is determi-
ned in part by economic resources and class composition, is of utter importance too. Moreo-
ver, there is a causal link between family background circumstances on the one hand and 
schooling on the other, in that the parents’ income and their choices determine the kind of  
schooling to which their children have access. 
These and other empirical conditions for educational achievement work as  obstacles for 
some children; they hinder the children from getting a good education. It is far from clear—
from a normative perspective—which of these obstacles have to be seen as illegitimate. Rival 
principles of justice in education give different answers to this question. One might even 
say that conceptions of educational justice can be distinguished according to how they ans-
wer this question. Following one of the classical approaches to equality of opportunity, for 
instance,  inequalities  of  opportunity  that  reflect  differences  of  natural  endowment  are 
morally acceptable, whereas inequalities resulting from social background must be seen as 
illegitimate. Brighouse defends similar ideas in many of his writings. In his book on school 
choice (2000, p. 118), he presents a principle of educational equality, stating that ‘educatio-
nal inequalities due to family background circumstances or family choices are unaccepta-
ble.’ Brighouse’s argument for this principle is based on two empirical assumptions: first, 
that there is a causal connection between a child’s family background and the quality of 
schooling that is provided for her; and second, that the quality of someone’s education in-
fluences his or her chances of success in competing for social rewards (e.g., income). Brig-
house, depending on a notion of desert that is linked to the concept of responsibility, thinks 
that  these  rewards should be  deserved.  Since  children did not choose their  family back-
ground, says Brighouse, they do not deserve to face the educational or social disadvantages 
that result from it. 
One problem of this argument is, as Brighouse acknowledges himself, that it does not 
only show the moral  illegitimacy of  social—but also of  natural—obstacles to educational 
achievement. ‘After all’, Brighouse concedes (ibid., p. 119), ‘we do not deserve our natural 
endowments or talents any more than we deserve our parents or the benefits they confer on 
us.’ So, it is possible to conclude that the unequal social rewards that are caused by genetic 
differences are unjust. In current papers written with Adam Swift (Brighouse and Swift, 
2008; 2009), he defends the classical view, also known as the meritocratic view, without re-
ferring to a justification that is based on the notions of responsibility and desert. The core 
idea of the meritocratic view is also present in his current paper on  [592] school choice, 
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where he supports the view that ‘equality consists in ensuring that social class background 
and racial background have no impact at all on achievement’ (Brighouse, 2008, p. 42). Social 
disadvantage is thus the primary obstacle to educational achievement that education policy 
should try to eliminate.2
On the one hand, it is possible to describe competing views of educational justice by cla-
rifying which obstacles they consider as unacceptable.  On the other, of course, one and the 
same obstacle might appear as illegitimate in very different normative contexts. This is why 
some education policies,  which  aim at  eliminating or  mitigating  some disadvantage or 
other, might be justified in light of diverging principles of educational justice.The mitigati-
on of social disadvantage, for instance, is widely accepted as a sensible aim of education po-
licy. Similarly, those who advocate choice policies based on the view that the unequal distri-
bution of opportunities for school choice is a serious obstacle to educational justice might 
not all endorse the very same principles. They do, however, share the view that school choi-
ce has the potential to eliminate some obstacles to educational opportunity or achievement 
that are seen as illegitimate within their view of justice. Within Brighouse’s normative fra-
mework, the primary question is whether choice policies have the potential to attenuate so-
cial disadvantage within the school system.
Opportunities and Probabilities
Let us consider more closely the educational disadvantages that school choice policies are 
thought to mitigate. Following Brighouse, it is crucial that children are all provided with an 
equally good education. If we accept this as an objective, we have to ask why current educa-
tion policy fails to achieve this. What obstacles prevent an equally good education from 
being accessible to all within the traditional system of neighbourhood schooling? 
First, we have to be aware of the fact that different schools within this system are not 
equally good. The quality of schooling is influenced by many factors, but let us focus on the 
two factors already mentioned: economic resources and class composition. Within a system 
of neighbourhood schooling, the spatial segregation of social classes leads to a social segre-
gation within the school system. It is well known that working-class children perform wor-
se at  school,  on average,  than middle-class children do. And it  is  often assumed that a 
child’s educational achievement also depends on the abilities and motivation of his or her 
classmates. If we take this as a fact, this means that social segregation in schools imposes 
additional disadvantages on working-class children. The situation is even worsened, when 
public schools are funded by local taxes, as is the case within the U.S. school system; here, 
the spatial segregation along social and economic lines brings about vast inequalities of re-
sources among schools, and these factors are likely to increase inequalities of achievement 
among children from different social backgrounds.
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[593] But even in countries where the schools in disadvantaged housing areas are sup-
ported with additional funds, inequalities of parental resources can amount to inequalities 
of schooling, since wealthy parents have the opportunity to move house or send their child-
ren to a private school if  they doubt the quality of the local state school.  As Brighouse 
points out, there is—at least in Western democracies—no educational system without choi-
ce: ‘Parental choice is always operative at the margins, as long as private schools are legal: 
anyone with the necessary funds can exit into the private sector. And within the state/pu-
blic  sector,  choice  always  has  an impact’  .  He concludes:  ‘The issue is  not  whether we 
should have choice, but what kind of choice we should have’ (Brighouse, 2008, p. 47). 
The traditional system can be seen as unjust because it provides opportunities for choice 
mainly to the wealthy classes. To give equal opportunities for choice to all of the parents,  
though, is not an end in itself, according to Brighouse; neither is a fair distribution of re-
sources. The issue is whether or not a particular choice system fosters an equally good edu-
cational provision for each child. 
‘Brighouse is extremely hopeful about the egalitarian potential of school choice serving 
as an instrument of social justice,’ writes Samara Foster (2002, p. 302). ‘Recent empirical evi-
dence  has  shown exactly  the  opposite  of  what  Brighouse  would  hope  for.  Evidence  is 
mounting to confirm that choice schemes are ‘making things worse’ for social justice by ex-
acerbating stratification along lines of class, race and special needs.’  My aim in this paper is 
not to decide whether Foster’s empirical assumptions are correct but to clarify the role of 
such assumptions within a philosophical argument about school choice. Recall Brighouse’s 
view that empirical evidence of the kind Foster presents does not matter in the philosophi-
cal evaluation of different choice schemes.  According to Brighouse (2008),  we can judge 
progressive or targeted voucher schemes to be more equitable than unregulated programs 
even we do not know about the effects of such mechanisms in a particular context.
Brighouse’s evaluations are, of course, highly plausible—targeted voucher schemes, for 
instance, that are restricted to the socially disadvantaged, provide poor families with oppor-
tunities (for choice) that they do not have in the neighbourhood system. Progressive vou-
cher schemes take into account the fact that socially disadvantaged children usually need 
more educational resources than children from middle-class families. Such schemes are ‘lia-
ble to be much less inequitable than other schemes, and if the vouchers are sufficiently well 
calibrated to the needs of the child, that will off-set worries about schools control over ad-
missions because schools will have incentives to admit otherwise undesirable pupils, and 
schools  stuck  with otherwise  undesirable  pupils  will  be  well  compensated’  (Brighouse, 
2008, p. 54). Discriminatory admission practices limit the opportunities of the socially disad-
vantaged who might not be accepted by the school of their choice. To provide them with 
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additional resources is one way to mitigate this problem without preventing schools from 
selecting their pupils. 
[594] As Brighouse makes clear, it is his aim to show that some choice schemes are more 
likely to promote educational equality than others. In other words, some choice schemes 
move us toward equality  more probably  or with a higher probability.  In this context, it is im-
portant to distinguish the concept of probability from the concept of opportunity. Previous-
ly I mentioned that targeted or progressive voucher schemes provide disadvantaged fami-
lies with more opportunities (for choice) than other systems. I did not, however, say that 
these schemes have a higher probability of fostering educational justice. 
In many situations, giving someone the opportunity to do X increases the probability 
that she will choose to do X, but whether she will in fact make this choice depends on her 
attitudes toward X, her beliefs concerning X, as well as her preferences, values and ambiti-
ons. In the context of school choice, it is often argued that the kind of educational choices 
that parents make depends on their socio-economic status; middle-class parents, it is assu-
med, are not only more competent and better-informed choosers than working-class pa-
rents, they also have different values or ambitions concerning the education of their child-
ren. This is why, as opponents of school choice often claim, choice policies might increase 
social segregation within the school system. And segregation along social lines is likely to 
exacerbate the inequalities of educational achievement between the social classes.
Brighouse is well aware of this argument that is based on two empirical assumptions. 
With regard to the second assumption, he notes that segregation might not have the conse-
quences indicated above in every possible context.  Whether social segregation has to be 
seen as unjust, he says, depends on its effects with respect to educational equality in a parti-
cular context (see Brighouse, 2007). Concerning the first of these two assumptions, he says 
that it is wrong to ask whether wealthy parents are better choosers than poor parents. The 
crucial question is, ‘whether poor parents are better choosers than the state was on their be-
half in the pre-choice era. If the state chose better in the past than poorer parents do now, 
then we should expect a worsening of inequality; if it chose worse, than we should expect  
an improvement with respect to equality (and, possibly, segregation)’ (Brighouse, 2008, p. 
49). Brighouse is convinced that, at least in some U.S. school districts, the state ‘chooses’ so 
badly that it is virtually impossible to make a worse choice. In countries where the public 
system provides a good education for each child, things might be different, as Brighouse 
admits. He acknowledges that it is an empirical question how well parents choose in a par-
ticular context.
But he denies that the empirical quality of parental choices (as well as their further con-
sequences in terms of a child’s educational achievement) is relevant to his project of asses-
sing different choice schemes. By describing some choice programs as more equitable than 
6
Evaluating School Choice Policies
others, he does not refer to their effects on the distribution of educational quality or achieve-
ment but mainly to the opportunities they provide. The problem is that securing a fair dis-
tribution of opportunities for choice does not necessarily increase the probability that edu-
cation (in the sense of  [595] educational quality or outcomes) is distributed more equally. 
For instance, we cannot know with certainty that a well-designed choice system providing 
equal opportunities to all the families is more likely (i.e., more probable) to foster educatio-
nal equality than the traditional system of neighbourhood schooling. 
Imagine, though, that we had complete, detailed empirical knowledge about the conse-
quences of different choice systems in particular contexts. In this case, I guess, Brighouse 
would no longer claim that empirical knowledge about the effects of different choice sys-
tems is irrelevant to their normative evaluation. As explained above, Brighouse’s concepti-
on of educational justice is not situated on the level of opportunities for choice. According 
to his view, it is crucial to know whether a certain reform program helps to provide each 
child with an equally good education.  The lack of opportunities for choice can work as an 
obstacle for some parents and children, preventing them from getting a good education, but 
eliminating that obstacle might clear the way for another obstacle—parental choice. By limi-
ting his philosophical assessment of choice policies to an evaluation of the opportunities 
they provide, he is restricting his attention to only one empirical factor that has the potential 
to bring about educational inequalities. 
Conclusion
So, is it ‘beside the point’ to criticise Brighouse's assessments of school choice policies with 
reference to empirical data? Without a doubt, it is inadequate to his philosophical intenti-
ons. Brighouse does not claim that those choice schemes that he judges to be more just than 
others necessarily bring about positive effects with respect to equality. His claim is, howe-
ver, that some schemes are more likely than others to produce these effects. There are at least 
two interpretations of this claim. If it is read as a statement about probabilities, it runs con-
trary to Brighouse’s own intentions. To say that some scheme brings about positive conse-
quences with a higher probability than some other scheme is to make an empirical predicti-
on, and this is what Brighouse refuses to do.
According to a second reading, Brighouse’s evaluations are concerned not with probabi-
lities but with the distribution of opportunities for choice. How these opportunities are dis-
tributed is part of the empirical conditions determining the distribution of educational in-
puts or outcomes, but in order to evaluate different policies in the light of Brighouse’s egali-
tarian principle, it would be necessary to be informed about all of the empirical factors that 
determine the effects of these policies in different circumstances. An evaluation constrained 
to one of these factors is of limited relevance to policy makers; it is important, of course, to 
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be aware of the fact that different choice schemes differ in their distribution of opportunities 
for choice. But when deciding whether to introduce a certain choice scheme or not, this is 
not enough to know. We should not give up the traditional neighbourhood system just be-
cause some well-designed [596] choice program provides better opportunities to disadvan-
taged families. We would only have reason to do this if we could expect it to establish a  
more just (or more equitable) distribution of education. In this sense, it is not beside the 
point to refer to empirical data in normative deliberations on school choice.
NOTES
1 Rob Reich (2007), on the other hand, intends to justify school choice with reference to the value of paren -
tal liberty. If parents are allowed to choose their children’s education according to their own values, it 
seems clear that not all children will receive an equal education. Nevertheless, their education might be 
equally good, in a rough sense. This, at least, is what Brighouse assumes. His vague notion of educational 
equality is compatible with a religious, ethical, political or pedagogical pluralism within the school sys-
tem.
2 But the attempt to eliminate this principle is constrained, according to Brighouse’s (and Swift’s) view, by 
two other values: the integrity of the family and concern for benefiting the less advantaged (see Brighou-
se and Swift 2008).
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